

10 August 1966

Dear John:

Here's a better draft of my ponderous pacification project. Minus annexes, it is not yet a phone book--Pentagon style.

But I'm bold enough to say that it makes basic sense as the recipe for beefing up pacification, though it still needs polishing. It's what I'm asking Bill Leonhart to try out privately on Lodge and Porter--for them to make their own if they will.

I'm leery of asking Bill to show it to Westy, but will if you see merit.

If you have any flash reactions before Leonhart leaves at 2 p.m. --or after--I'm all ears.

Sincerely,

R. W. Komer

Attachment

The Honorable John T. McNaughton
Assistant Secretary for ISA
The Department of Defense

7 August 1966

GIVING A NEW THRUST TO PACIFICATION

Analysis, Concept, and Management

There is a growing consensus that the US/GVN pacification effort needs to be stepped up, that management of our pacification assets is not yet producing an acceptable rate of return for our heavy support investments, and that pacification operations should be brought more abreast of our developing military effort against the NVA and VC main force. The President has expressed this view, and so has Ambassador Lodge among others.

I. What Is Pacification? In one sense, "pacification" can be used to encompass the whole of the military, political, and civil effort in Vietnam. But the term needs to be narrowed down for operational purposes, and can be reasonably well separated out as a definable problem area.

If we divide the US/GVN problem into four main components, three of them show encouraging progress. The campaign against the major VC/NVA units is in high gear, the constitutional process seems to be evolving favorably, and we expect to contain inflation while meeting most needs of the civil economy. But there is a fourth problem area, that of securing the countryside and getting the peasant involved in the struggle against the Viet Cong, where we are lagging way behind. It is this problem area which I would term that of pacification.

The statistics--inaccurate though they may be--are enough to tell the tale. Though we have the military initiative everywhere in Vietnam, only 54.3% of the population is as yet regarded as being under GVN control. Worse yet under MACV's new criteria for area control only 11% of Vietnam's land area is regarded as under secure control. As we all know, moreover, the VC are able to operate and recruit even in areas listed as being secure.

At risk of over-simplification, I see management of the pacification problem as involving three main subtasks: (1) providing local security in the countryside--essentially a military/police/cadre task; (2) breaking the hold of the VC over the people; and (3) positive programs to win the active support of the rural population.

II. Why Stress Pacification? Possibly we can achieve a satisfactory outcome in Vietnam without rapidly accelerating the pacification process. Success in destroying the main VC/NVA units and in attriting Hanoi's infiltration may in itself lead the enemy to fade away or negotiate. Or it may lead to a disastrous drop in local VC morale. Yet other imponderables, such as Mao's death, may have decisive influence.

But few argue that we can assure success in Vietnam without also winning the "village war." Chasing the large units around the boondocks still leaves intact the VC infrastructure, with its local guerrilla capability plus the weapons of terror and intimidation. The VC can always revert primarily to guerrilla action, even though some argue that this would be an admission of defeat with major psychological consequences. So winning the "village war," which I will loosely call pacification, seems an indispensable ingredient of any high-confidence strategy and a necessary precaution to close the guerrilla option.

Moreover, we have now reached the point where we must seriously examine the situation we'd confront in event of negotiation combined with a military stand-down on both sides. We would be at a major disadvantage if we had no structure in the countryside adequate to compete with the Viet Cong infrastructure. So a major aim in accelerating pacification is to put the GVN in a better position to compete for the allegiance of the countryside in a situation of military standdown.

Next, pacification gets at what may be an even more vulnerable target than the NVA. Leon Goure points out, on the basis of his exhaustive studies, that morale appears considerably lower among the local VC than the NVA. They have borne the brunt of the struggle for two decades; and now, as we take the chance for an early victory from them, they are tiring. If defeated, they (unlike the NVA) must either remain in SVN and pay the consequences or give up everything as they retreat to the North. Thus, the VC are bound to face greater pressures to defect or to accommodate by ceasing to support "the cause." Goure's well documented case makes me wonder if we are paying too much attention to the tougher NVA target, and not enough to the easier--the VC. Pacification is clearly one way to put new pressures on the VC and to capitalize on favorable psychological conditions that already exist.

Yet another reason for stressing pacification is that the US is supporting a lot of assets in being which are at the moment poorly employed. Even the bulk of the ARVN, which increasingly sits back and watches the US take over the more difficult parts of the war against main enemy units and bases, might be more effectively used for this purpose. Aside from the ARVN itself, we have many other Vietnamese assets--RF, PF, police, CIDG's, the RD cadres, combat youth, and above all the existing GVN administrative structure. We also have the growing capability of the RD Ministry. The trained RD cadre groups, acclaimed as the answer to rural pacification (which they alone are not), have recently begun operating in the field. By proper management and employment of all these assets the GVN might be able to achieve much greater results in the countryside. Thus, even if one contends that pacification as I have defined it is not vital to a win strategy, stepping up this effort would add little to present costs and might produce substantial pay-offs.

Beyond these reasons, the time is psychologically ripe for greater emphasis on pacification. South Vietnamese confidence is growing as the US turns the tide. New US/FW military forces are arriving to reinforce the campaign against the main enemy formations; their presence will release much needed assets to pacification. The GVN, fresh from success against the Buddhist led struggle and confidently facing an election process leading toward a constitution, also has been making the kind of tough decisions--devaluation, turnover of the Saigon Port to military management, etc.--that will be needed in pacification too.

In sum, the assets are available and the time is ripe for an increased push to win the "village war."

III. What is Holding Up the Pacification Process? The long history of the Vietnam struggle is replete with efforts to secure the countryside. Most of them, like Diem's strategic hamlet program, proved abortive. Now we are engaged in yet another program--one based partly on the new RD cadres and a beefed up RD Ministry under the competent leadership of Gen. Thang. This effort is promising, but given the pace at which we are now moving it will produce only gradual results. In any case pacification involves much more than the programs now under General Thang. First and foremost is the problem of providing reasonable local security, which must fall chiefly on the US and ARVN forces in the field. Some of the chief difficulties we confront are suggested below:

A. We had to go after the major VC/NVA units first. The VC, increasingly supported by men and materiel from the North, had by late 1964 launched their Phase III campaign for the final defeat of South Vietnam. By spring of 1965 a series of VC victories in major battles had alarmingly weakened GVN morale and seriously depleted the ARVN general reserve. Government instability and lack of popular support also threatened GVN ability to continue the war. So once we decided to introduce US combat forces, these units--reinforced by the ARVN--had to be directed immediately against the principal threat posed by the major VC/NVA units. It was a matter of first things first. But as a result there has been little increase in the military assets specifically allocated to creating local security in the countryside.

B. The VC/NVA have been able to select the weakest point in an embryonic GVN pacification effort and destroy it with a lightning attack. They have successfully coped with past pacification attempts by maintaining an offensive posture, which coupled with their superior strategic mobility, has given them an ability to attack at a time and with a method of their own choosing. Sometimes the attack has been frontal, using regular battalions; at other times harassment by guerrillas (clearly backed by stronger units); often simple terror tactics have been enough.

C. There are inherent difficulties in the pacification process itself. Aside from the fact that pacification has had to take a back seat to other aspects of the US/GVN effort are the inherent difficulties of getting a handle on the problem itself. Clearing out the local VC and gaining the support of the rural population is a more difficult matter to approach conceptually than military operations against larger VC/NVA units. Nor in general can US personnel be as readily substituted for Vietnamese. Moreover, pacification is a civil/military, rather than straight military problem.

It is made doubly difficult by the weakness of the GVN local administrative structure, frayed by years of war and VC harassment. Another major problem is the sheer difficulty of finding adequate and reliable measures both of the real extent of the pacification problem and of progress made toward meeting it.

D. Lack of high quality assets. Pacification has also had to take a back seat in the sense that it generally gets only the lowest grade GVN assets--and not enough of these.

On the military side this is amply demonstrated by the low quality of the RF and PF. The 300,000 man regular ARVN--which gets the cream of Vietnamese manpower and leadership, has the great bulk of the firepower and mobility, and receives first priority for US support--contributes relatively little to pacification. So the indispensable local security function has suffered by being assigned mostly to low quality, mostly para-military forces inadequately trained or motivated to compete with the local VC.

On the civil side, we lack enough skilled Vietnamese manpower for civilian tasks, particularly local government, largely because of VC terrorism aimed at local village and hamlet chiefs. Beyond this an ineptly handled draft system has skimmed off for the armed forces more than their share of skilled people. American hiring practices, especially among contractors, remove more of the most capable workers, low-level civil servants, and key local administrators. These and other contributing factors have led to a major deficiency--as concluded by the recent Werts manpower study--in skilled GVN manpower for essential civilian tasks. Then, too, the slowly increasing amount of dollars and piasters that the US and GVN are devoting to pacification still is piddling indeed compared to our investment in other sectors of the US/GVN effort.

E. Last but not least, neither the US nor the GVN have as yet developed an adequate plan, program, or management structure for dealing with pacification. While we have made some progress in this direction (see Annex A), the fact is that there is still no unified, central planning or direction of the pacification effort on either the US or GVN sides. Nor is there any unified management of pacification at the region, province, or district level.

1. The JGS and MACV are so pre-occupied, however justifiably, with operations against the major VC/NVA units, that they are not able to pay enough attention to the local security aspects of pacification. For example, despite the importance of this aspect of pacification operations, there is no general officer in JGS or MACV primarily tasked with overseeing this job.
2. There is no unified civil/military direction of pacification within the GVN. While RF/PF, for example, are technically under the province chief in the field, in fact, the chain of command, logistics and promotion is up through division and corps to the JGS. On the civil side, the RD Ministry is charged with pacification and its authority strengthened, but it lacks control over not only the RF/PF but also the police. Thus there are many GVN fingers in the pacification pie, many of them reaching all the way into the province chief's business.
3. A similar divided responsibility prevails on the US side. While last March Porter was given full authority under Lodge for US support of pacification/RD programs, US support of the military elements engaged in pacification remains with MACV, and the bulk of the Americans in the provinces (and all of them in the districts) are uniformed advisors working under MACV rather than under a civilian chain of command.
4. Nor does there yet appear to be a well-understood chain of command from Porter even to the civilians operating in the field. What is the relationship between Porter's charter and that of the USAID, MACV, and JUSPAO chiefs in Saigon? If Porter is to have command responsibility for all pacification/RD operations, he is also entitled to a strong management staff for the purpose. He now has a chief of staff and is building a staff, but is it big enough, or its mandate clear enough, for the job? The present method of operation in Saigon requires that all guidance on pacification emanating from the Deputy Ambassador's office to field personnel go through the entire separate chain of command of each civilian agency, a long process during which things often get distorted or delayed. Emphasis intended by the Ambassador in Saigon may no longer be understood by the time an idea or order has gone through, say, the Director of JUSPAO, his Associate Director for Field Services, the Regional JUSPAO representative, and finally emerges at the province level. The same is true for USAID and CAS.
5. There is no integrated civil/military plan for pacification on either the GVN or US side. While AB 141 at least provides an agreed US/GVN outline plan for military operations, it does not go into any detail on pacification as defined herein. Even among US agencies there is no single [coordinated] comprehensive plan for the use of all available US/GVN assets needed in the pacification task. US elements in Saigon are now working on such a plan for

CY 1967, prior to discussing it with the GVN. This is a big step forward. On the civilian side, the RD Ministry has an RD plan for CY 1966, prepared in loose coordination with the US Mission. This too is a big step forward, but it does not pretend to cope with the problem of coordinating the GVN military contribution to pacification with that of the civil side.

In sum, the GVN/US pacification effort suffers from numerous deficiencies in concept, planning, unified management, money, and manpower--which taken together critically reduce our ability to produce a new surge forward on pacification. Some of these deficiencies will be difficult to overcome, for example that of achieving unified management responsibility for military and civil assets involved in pacification. There would be numerous practical difficulties, for example, in putting military assets under civilian control or vice versa. Yet if stepping up our progress in pacification is essential a lot more needs to be done. Section IV, which follows, provides some suggestions along these lines.

IV. How Do We Step Up Pacification? As pacification is a multi-faceted civil/military problem, it demands a multi-faceted civil/military response. No single program properly managed and supported would give us a breakthrough in this field. The path to both quick impact and accelerated progress is through better management, and coordination of the host of contributory programs--most of them already in existence. However, some things are more important than others. The key elements which I recommend stressing are outlined below.

A. Provide more adequate, continuous security for the locales in which pacification is taking place. This is the essential prerequisite. None of our civil programs in the countryside can be expected to be effective unless the area is reasonably secure. Nor, unless the people are protected, are their attitudes likely to change in favor of the GVN. Local security is more than protection from marauding guerrillas or terrorist bands; it includes protection against the resident VC companies and battalions that back up the irregular forces and terrorists. To provide this requires the assignment on a long-term basis of enough assets to defeat these resident VC companies and battalions, in addition to providing 24-hour security to the people in the hamlets and villages until they are able to assist in providing their own protection. This is primarily the task of the RF and PF, supported by the RD cadres and police. We need to re-examine the adequacy of all these assets, and make sure they are up to the job. Some rationalization or consolidation of the many types of forces engaged in pacification may well be indicated to clarify roles and missions and reduce overhead.

Some knowledgeable experts contend that even if we improve the effectiveness and coordination of the RF, PF, police and cadres, they are together insufficient to extend local security much beyond existing secured areas. They feel that lacking mobility and heavy firepower, these forces must be thickened with a liberal sprinkling of regular ARVN units working in the area outside the immediate territory undergoing pacification. I do not suggest that ARVN regulars gainfully employed in battle against the enemy main forces be so diverted. I do urge that those ARVN forces not now fully engaged--a substantial fraction of the total--be used to contribute directly to improving local security.

B. We must devote more effort to breaking the hold of the VC over the people. Providing greater physical security is not enough. So long as the VC local infrastructure remains present in the countryside, security becomes an unending task. Moreover, the VC infrastructure is a source of money, manpower, rice, and intelligence to the VC/NVA main force. For example, a recently captured document shows that 4,000 main and local force recruits were signed up during 1965 in one relatively secure Delta province. Though this is 16% fewer than in 1965, the significant fact is that the annual number of recruits from one province is equivalent to about a month's infiltration from the North.

To break the VC's hold over the countryside requires the skillful application of intelligence, psywar, and police techniques. Expansion of police special branch operations is particularly essential, but other intelligence sources must also be targeted increasingly on this task. New technical means, such as equipment for detecting a person who has recently handled a weapon, might be much more widely employed.

The information and psychological activities of the GVN have great import and the Chieu Hoi program also makes its contribution in offering the VC village and district cadre a suitable alternative. Operations of the "County Fair" type offer another approach to accelerating the process of shattering VC influence among the peasants. The whole range of sub-programs designed to destroy the VC infrastructure or to drive a wedge between it and the people deserve priority attention.

C. Carry out positive revolutionary development programs to win active popular support. The cliché of winning support by offering the people a better life through a series of inter-related revolutionary development programs has great relevance in Vietnam. Moreover, these programs to improve the peasants' lot are the very programs that the US can support so well. Nevertheless, because of the diversity of effort, it has not always been possible to correlate the programs in time and place with the needs of the people or with pacification priorities. We need to concentrate on first things first by putting enough effort into a limited number of high-impact programs--primary education, medical, agriculture, self-help, etc.--to more than make up for anticipated inefficiency in carrying them out. These are discussed in Annex E. We also need a much better US monitoring system to see whether actual pacification operations, as they occur in the villages and hamlets, match the plans developed in Saigon.

D. Establish functional priorities for pacification. The technique of establishing priorities for converting concepts into plans and finally action programs has not yet been fully applied to pacification. The US civil-side program alone is broken down into 277 different administrative activities. Clearly, management is a formidable task. The US Mission has prepared a report on functional priorities (the Klein Report) that represents a first step toward a rational listing of priorities guiding the civil-side effort. Steps to translate the study into meaningful, coordinated program and sub-program guidance are essential in time to influence the CY 67 GVN budget and supporting US programs. Functional programs deserving top priority include: local security, Chieu Hoi, RD cadre, rice control, village/hamlet administration, and police special branch (see Annex E).

E. Better area priorities must also be applied to pacification operations in the field. Clearly, present capabilities for area control and pacification support are limited and may not correspond with the four National Priority Areas to which the GVN and ourselves are committed. More attention should be given to working first in those areas where greatest progress is feasible. A few instances of real success could very well spark the entire pacification machinery into more vigorous and productive action.

A greater stress on pacification logically means greater stress on the Delta-- where 60% of the people are and most of the rice is grown. The picture in the IV Corps Zone is confused, but there seems to be a consensus among observers that its relatively static nature betokens some form of accommodation between our side and the VC. Because there are no US ground forces in IV Corps, we lack any readily available US instrument to galvanize the military effort. Our plans take care of this, but not until next year. We should look at ways to take action much sooner.

F. Concentrate additional resources on pacification. Beyond the matter of priorities, neither the US nor the GVN is thinking big enough, or moving fast enough, on the civil side to complement the military effort--or to achieve reasonably quick results. Arguments made in the past that pacification is a delicate subject to be approached only with care and precision have lost some of their relevance as the intensity of warfare has increased. Annex E discusses those programs which should probably be expanded; they are merely summarized here.

- Police (Expansion to the ultimate 150,000 strength goal can be accelerated).
- RD Cadre (They should be expanded as fast as quality can be maintained. The key are proper training, motivation, and supervision. Higher salaries can be paid to induce capable leaders and supervisors to join and stay with the program).
- Material support for pacification (Increased amounts of cement, roofing, bridging, road construction materials, lumber, etc. can be used as the number of operating cadre teams grows and the secure area enlarges).

- The US agricultural effort (85% of the people of SVN live on an agricultural economy, but only a modest agricultural program is underway--one that could be expanded through more agricultural experts in the rural areas, a systematic effort to develop a local seed industry, expanded fertilizer distribution, and stepped-up animal husbandry).
- Chieu Hoi (With the cost per defector running 1/100th the cost per enemy killed by military action, much more can be afforded to insure that the effort at least keeps pace with expanding military operations. A generous incentive program paying defectors in kind with land and farm tools might be productive).
- Village/Hamlet Administration (Far too little is being done by the GVN to strengthen its permanent presence at the vital local levels. On the US side, the USAID Public Administration Division is ill-equipped to cope with the full dimensions of this problem. Field advice on village/hamlet administration, since it cannot and should not be separated from other advice on pacification activities, must be the responsibility of the AID province representative).

G. Set more performance goals. One quick way to focus direction and get action is to set tough targets at which to shoot, and ask for concrete plans to meet them. Even though the history of pacification in Vietnam is replete with examples of goals set and goals met without substance or meaning, this is no reason not to keep trying. As an initial step those "Honolulu Goals" approved on the US side should be revived as targets for end 1966 and extended to cover 1967. Concrete proposals are discussed in Annex C.

Along with these goals must go adequate criteria by which to measure progress and a system for monitoring it. The US Mission and GVN should review goals and criteria together to reach a commonly understood and consistent system. See Annex D.

H. Rapidly extend the security of key roads. Ambassador Lodge points to the close correlation between Vietnamese belief that the war is being won and the degree of security on important roads such as Route 15 to Vung Tau and Route 20 to Da Lat. The people in Saigon daily are made aware of price fluctuations of perishable commodities in the markets as security of major routes of communication varies. If we want to achieve psychological gains by demonstrating that the war is being won, and at the same time help counter inflationary pressures and improve the mobility of our forces, we should direct a significant portion of pacification assets to keeping open selected land routes. Because the population is clustered along these routes, forces used would largely be accomplishing two missions concurrently--protection of the people and security of the routes themselves. Although plans for the US/Free World buildup of ground combat forces provide forces for route protection between

principal bases, additional Vietnamese forces should be concentrated on a task which has been slighted up to now.

I. Systematize the flow of refugees. Refugees are handled in a haphazard manner by a weak GVN organization backed up mainly from the US side by commodity and other forms of support. Little, if any, attention is given to using refugees as a systematic weapon in the war. The proposition is simple--deprive the VC of needed bodies and add to the GVN manpower pool at the same time. Do this by selecting specific groups of people as targets, induce them using a whole range of possible pressures to abandon their homes, process them through temporary centers, sort them to convert usable skills into GVN assets, and resettle them in accordance with overall pacification plans. Some of the strongest areas in SVN today are a direct result of Ngo Dinh Diem's refugee policies. It seems too bad that this practice of using refugees as a pacification weapon has fallen into disuse.

J. Get better control over rice. Rice collections from the Delta will only be an estimated 325,000 tons this year compared to 700,000 tons in 1963. Obviously the VC, not the GVN/US, are exercising control over rice. A lot is being smuggled to Cambodia. Several solutions to reverse the trend, ranging from barriers along the Cambodian border to price subsidies, have been proposed. All cost men, money and materials, but are probably worth the price. Goure's studies show that feeding themselves and their NVA compatriots is becoming a more and more difficult task for the VC. Indeed, it is probably cheaper to starve the VC/NVA than to kill them. Rice is the great staple in SVN--if better rice controls are instituted, it should be possible to limit the number of troops the enemy can support. At the very least, rice control can make the enemy tighten his belt and lower his morale. Increased rice collection at a decent price can also be a powerful incentive to the peasant to opt for our side. Since the US is planning to furnish at least 400,000 tons of aid rice to SVN this year, there can be a direct trade-off between resources expended on controlling rice and dollar savings in purchasing rice for SVN. The Mission is studying this problem which deserves very high priority.

V. How Can Pacification be Managed More Effectively? If we accept that pacification involves numerous inter-related civilian and military programs and sub-programs, coordinated and effective management is one of the keys to success. In my view, there are few ways to get quicker results than to improve the management on both the GVN and US sides.

A. Restructuring the GVN. Unlike the military effort against the main force, which is increasingly being taken over by US forces, the pacification effort must be basically Vietnamese. We cannot spare the manpower. But any adequate GVN pacification effort requires certain modifications to the present organization and operating procedures. Most of these changes have already been proposed by various GVN leaders charged with pacification responsibilities. Because of the strong political overtones associated with pacification, however, these recommendations have been opposed, ignored, or accepted only partially and reluctantly by the GVN as a whole. Always in the background, as the ultimate power, is the Army headed by the Directorate which may insert itself anywhere it desires into the normal processes of government and rules on every important appointment and reorganization proposal. So a strong US push is indispensable.

The following modifications would markedly improve GVN management of pacification (they are covered in more detail in Annex G):

- Place the RF and PF under the RD Ministry. Premier Ky has proposed this major change--the key step in consolidating control over security, cadre, and reconstruction assets employed in the countryside. The needs of the RD Ministry, beset with an inexperienced staff, would be served best by the transfer solely of operational control of the RF and PF. Training and especially logistic support responsibilities should remain for practical reasons with the JGS.
- Establish a single line of command to the province chiefs. This line must start with the Minister of RD, who directs the pacification effort in the name of the Prime Minister, and should flow through the least possible number of subordinate echelons. The technical service chiefs representing the Saigon ministries in a province must be controlled by the province chief rather than through multiple, parallel chains of command originating in Saigon.
- Remove the division from the pacification chain of command. Division furnishes little more to pacification, as I have defined it, than troops for occasional use in the clearing and securing phases. So long as divisional units are logistically and administratively supported by their parent headquarters, there is no need for division to become involved with the operational control of battalion--or at the most regimental--size forces assigned pacification missions.

Furthermore, the existence of the Division Tactical Area as a permanent geographic/quasi-political "domain" serves to encourage ARVN division commanders to exert influence over province chiefs in the matters of pacification. Were these DTAs to be abolished as permanent boundaries and replaced instead by temporary tactical areas of operation, established in each instance according to the requirements of a specific operation, this would assist in redirecting the division commanders' attention towards what is their legitimate perview--tactical operations against VC/NVA main forces. Throughout the four corps areas of South Vietnam, there are sufficient enemy main forces to require each ARVN division to devote its principal effort to their defeat.

- Strengthen the authority of the Province Chiefs. They must be the "single managers" of the pacification effort. A few spot promotions from Lt. Col. to Col. for deserving province chiefs would not only raise them to a rank commensurate with their responsibilities, but serve as a reminder to all military officers that assignment to pacification duties was not a career deadend.
- Appoint civilian chiefs in selected provinces and districts. In a number of these political awareness has reached the point where the right civilian installed as chief might galvanize support from the activist segment of the people and accelerate pacification.

B. Parallel strengthening of the Structure is essential. US leadership has often sparked major pacification steps by the GVN. The structure for managing pacification advice to the GVN, and direct US military/civilian support, have evolved slowly as the US contributions have grown. Once it was possible to coordinate the US pacification effort through an interagency committee for strategic hamlets. Later the Mission Council concept was used extensively. In the wake of the Honolulu Conference, the President appointed Ambassador Porter to take charge of the non-military effort in SVN. Several highly qualified people now give Porter the nucleus of a coordination and operations staff. However, if we expect to manage a rapidly growing effort and to maintain an organization that can adequately influence and assist a GVN organization, the US management structure must be strengthened considerably more.

There are three broad alternatives, each building on the present structure, which could produce the needed result. Two of them are based on the principle of a "single manager" over both civilian and military assets by assigning command responsibility either to Porter or Westmoreland. The third accepts a continued division between the civil and military sides for numerous practical reasons, but calls for strengthening the management structure of both.

Alternative No. 1--Give Porter operational control over all US pacification activity. The concept would be that, since General Westmoreland and MACV are necessarily preoccupied with the war against the VC/NVA major units, those military advisory assets which bear primarily on pacification should be placed under Porter.

Today each US agency has its own "field operations" section for pacification. called MACV/J33, Field Operations, Field Services, or the so-called Covert Action Branch. These sections are largely duplicative and could well be merged directly under Ambassador Porter. This merged office, headed by a man who would in essence be the chief of staff for the US Mission for field operations, would combine the four swollen "field operations" sections into a single streamlined staff, with no regard to the agency of origin of each person. Control over these people would be removed from their parent agencies.

Furthermore, all field personnel in the advisory business--MACV advisory teams at province and district, CAS case officers for both RD cadre and Special Branch, JUSPAO psywarriors, and AID field personnel including technical experts such as agricultural and education advisors--would then receive their guidance and orders from a single source. This would end the practice, now growing by leaps and bounds, of each Saigon-based division or branch putting its own men out into the provinces.

At the province level, the burgeoning US presence requires a team chief, to be selected by the Office of the Deputy Ambassador regardless of agency. Everyone in the province would report for his orders to the team chief who would be the US single manager for pacification in his area. Reporting to Saigon, and guidance on pacification to Americans in the field would move through a single channel, rather than four, as at present.

Alternative No. 2--Retain the present separate civil and military command channels but strengthen the management structure of both MACV and the US Mission. This option, recognizing the practical difficulties of putting US civilian and military personnel under a single chief, would be to settle for improved coordination at the Saigon level.

To facilitate improved coordination, however, it would require strengthening the organization for pacification within MACV and the US Mission. MACV disposes of by far the greater number of Americans working on pacification in the field. It has advisory teams spending most of their time on pacification in 200 out of 230 districts and in all 43 provinces. These teams--not counting advisors at division, corp and all tactical units down to battalion--number about 2000 men compared with about one-eighth this number from all other US agencies combined.

However, the senior officer in MACV dealing with pacification as his principal function is now a colonel heading the J33 staff division. Moreover, with 400,000 US troops soon to be committed, General Westmoreland, his subordinate commanders and his principal staff officers must spend increasing time on military operations associated with defeating the VC/NVA main formations. Therefore, management of the tremendous advisory resources within MACV inevitably suffers regardless of General Westmoreland's personal effort to give balanced attention to both.

Hence there might be merit in COMUSMACV having a senior deputy to manage pacification within MACV and pacification advice to the JCS, as well as throughout the Vietnamese military chain of command. Key staff sections, such as J33, Polwar Directorate, Senior Advisor for RF/PF, could be controlled by a chief of staff for pacification responsive to the Deputy. Advisory teams at corps and division would receive guidance and orders on pacification from the Deputy. Province and district advisors would receive all orders, except routine administrative instructions, through the pacification channel.

To parallel the MACV organization and provide a single point of liaison on the civil side, Ambassador Porter should have his own field operations office formed by merging USAID Field Operations, JUSPAO Field Services and CAS Covert Action Branch. Control over the people assigned would be removed, as in Alternative I, from their parent agency. All civilian field personnel in the advisory business would also receive their guidance and orders from the Deputy Ambassador.

For this dual civilian-military system to operate effectively, the closest coordination would be required between the offices of the MACV deputy and the Deputy Ambassador. Since it is difficult and dangerous to separate military and civilian aspects of pacification at the province level, most policy guidance and instructions to the provinces hopefully would be issued jointly and be received by the senior military and civilian advisors who would then develop their plans together.

I would still favor a single civil/military team chief in the province, even though he would have two bosses in Saigon talking to him through different and parallel chains of command. Alternatively, since MACV already has a senior advisor in each province it would be possible similarly to assign a single civilian as the Vietnamese province chief's point of contact on all non-military matters. All other civilians in the province would be under his control.

Alternative No. 3--Assign responsibility for pacification, civil and military, to COMUSMACV. This is not a new suggestion, and has a lot to recommend it. In 1964, General Westmoreland proposed that he be made "executive agent" for pacification. MACV at that time had an even greater preponderance of field advisors than it does today, and was devoting the bulk of its attention to pacification. Since the military still has by far the greatest capacity among US agencies in

Vietnam for management and the military advisors outnumber civilians at least 8 to 1 in the field, MACV could readily take on responsibility for all pacification matters.

Turning over the entire pacification management task to COMUSMACV would require him to reorganize his staff to handle simultaneously the very large military operations business involving US, Free World and Vietnamese forces and the civil/military aspects of pacification at the same time. The USAID, JUSPAO, and CAS Covert Operations staffs would come under COMUSMACV's control where they would be used as additional "component commands". In this case, it might be desirable to have a civilian deputy to COMUSMACV for pacification.

Also appropriate under this concept would be a single US advisory team, under a team chief, at each subordinate echelon. The result would be a single chain of command to the field and coordinated civilian/military pacification planning and operations on the US side. The US Mission would speak to Vietnamese corps and division commanders, province chiefs and district chiefs with a single voice.

VI. Recommended Actions To Give a New Thrust to Pacification.

A. Washington level actions bearing on concept and organization:

1. Obtain Presidential approval of the organizational concept for the US Mission in Vietnam:

Under Alternative 1:

- Expand the control of the Deputy Ambassador over pacification and strengthen his staff.
- Place USAID, JUSPAO, and CAS Covert Action Branch in "component command" relationships under direct control of the Deputy Ambassador.
- Remove the field operations staffs from MACV, USAID, JUSPAO and CAS and integrate them into a single RD office under the Deputy Ambassador.
- Give the Deputy Ambassador operational control over MACV sector and subsector advisory teams.
- Place Press Office, separated from JUSPAO, directly under control of the Ambassador.

Under Alternative 2:

- Reemphasize the role of the Deputy Ambassador in pacification and strengthen his staff.
- Place USAID, JUSPAO, and CAS Covert Action Branch in "component command" relationships under direct control of the Deputy Ambassador.
- Remove the field operations staffs from USAID, JUSPAO, and CAS and integrate them into a single RD office under the Deputy Ambassador.
- Assign a Deputy, COMUSMACV for Pacification to manage the MACV contribution to pacification, coordinate advice on matters related to pacification to the JGS and the IV Corps, and control the MACV sector and subsector advisory teams.
- Place Press Office, separated from JUSPAO, directly under control of the Ambassador.

Under Alternative 3:

- Assign COMUSMACV overall responsibility for pacification.
 - Place the Deputy Ambassador (with changed title) under COMUSMACV as a deputy for pacification.
 - Give COMUSMACV operational control over USAID, JUSPAO, and CAS Covert Action Branch.
 - Restructure the MACV staff to form an integrated RD office using the existing USAID, JUSPAO, MACV and CAS field operations staffs.
 - Place Press Office, separated from JUSPAO, directly under control of the Ambassador.
2. Agree that US troops will not be committed to long-term pacification projects, except when related to base security.
 3. Assure that there is integrated civilian-military strategic planning for Vietnam.

B. Other Washington Actions:

1. Provide additional staff for the US Mission, without regard to parent agency, for requirements that cannot be met from resources now in SVN.

2. Produce resources, including funds and personnel, needed to carry out the expanded programs developed by the US Mission and approved in Washington.
3. Send a high-level US delegation to Saigon to impress upon GVN leaders the importance of concentrating pacification resources on the main issues using better and more integrated management, and selectively expanding the overall pacification effort.
4. Expedite the development of a basic military/civil pacification plan by providing a single agreed strategic concept and appropriate planning guidelines.


C. Unilateral Actions by the US Mission in Saigon:

1. Undertake the approved reorganization of the US Mission.
2. Recommend to Washington additional staff requirements.
3. Locate the joint US pacification staff, under the single managership of the Deputy Ambassador or the Deputy COMUSMACV for Pacification, depending on the alternative approved, in a single building.
4. Appoint US team chiefs in 43 provinces.
5. Clearly define areas of responsibility for each type of US advisor/representative in South Vietnam.
6. Seek ways to increase advisory leverage in provinces and in the ministries.
7. Assure integrated military-civilian strategic planning.
8. Integrate US logistic support systems wherever efficiency and responsiveness can be improved.
9. Begin preparing basic US plans for expanded pacification effort, for use in discussions with the GVN, based on guidelines received from Washington.

D. Actions by the GVN:


1. Revise, after joint planning sessions with the US Mission, pacification planning, programming and operations directives.
2. Elevate Ministry of Revolutionary Development to true superministerial status comparable to the Ministry of War.

3. Assign operational control of RF and PF to Ministry of Revolutionary Development.
4. Develop, in conjunction with the US Mission, the combined staffing arrangements within the Ministry of Revolutionary Development and the DGBFA that will insure coordination of US-GVN plans, programs, and operations.
5. Review, in conjunction with the US Mission, and realign roles and missions of pacification forces in accordance with principles of unity of effort, economy of force, mass, and security.
6. Prepare and implement, in conjunction with the US Mission, improved and/or expanded programs for Chieu Hoi, RD cadre, village/hamlet administration and Police Special Branch.
7. Develop, as a result of combined planning with the US Mission, an overall rice control plan and begin its phased implementation.
8. Remove the Division from the pacification chain of command to permit more effective province control of ARVN forces assigned pacification missions.
9. Appoint civilian province chiefs in selected provinces.
10. Spot promote deserving province chiefs to Colonel.



SCHEMATIC US ORGANIZATION
Alternative 3


(Integrated Civil/Military Chain of Command)



SCHEMATIC US ORGANIZATION

Alternative 2

(Split Military-Civilian Functions)



SCHEMATIC US ORGANIZATION

Alternative 1

(Single Manager Concept)